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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-2162 
___________ 
 
DENNIS SHIPMAN, on behalf of his minor child K.S. 
   
v. 
 
ALICIA ALI BROOKS 
 
Dennis Shipman, 
   Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D. Del. Civil No. 1-14-cv-01472) 
District Judge:  Honorable Gregory M. Sleet 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
February 19, 2016 
 
Before: FUENTES, KRAUSE and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 2, 2016) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Dennis Shipman, proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the United States District 
Court for the District of Delaware dismissing his civil rights action.  For the reasons that 
follow, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court.1 
 On December 10, 2014, Shipman filed a complaint against his son’s mother in 
District Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Shipman asked the District Court to review 
and vacate a November 25, 2014 order of the Delaware Supreme Court affirming a 
Delaware Family Court decision that granted by default judgment custody of his son to 
his son’s mother.  Shipman alleged that the Family Court lacked jurisdiction and failed to 
follow state law and procedures.  He claimed that the state court orders violate his rights 
to due process and equal protection and his rights under the Fourth Amendment.  
Shipman also moved to recuse the District Judge assigned to his case. 
 The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
and as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  The District Court explained that the 
Rooker-Feldman2 doctrine barred review of the Delaware state court decisions, that the 
Court must abstain to the extent the guardianship action remained pending in state court, 
and that, while the parties were presumably citizens of different states, the domestic 
relations exception to diversity jurisdiction applied.  The District Court also denied 
Shipman’s motion for recusal.  This appeal followed. 
                                              
1This appeal was previously dismissed for failure to pay the filing fee.  We grant 
Shipman’s motion to reopen his appeal and motion to proceed in forma pauperis. 
 
2Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of 
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 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our standard of review of the 
order of dismissal is plenary.  Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 
1999).  We review the denial of the recusal motion for abuse of discretion.  Jones v. 
Pittsburgh Nat’l Corp., 899 F.2d 1350, 1356 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 We agree with the District Court that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain Shipman’s 
complaint under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which established that federal district 
courts lack jurisdiction over suits that are essentially appeals from state-court judgments.  
Great Western Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 
2010).  “[T]here are four requirements that must be met for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 
to apply:  (1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff ‘complain[s] of 
injuries caused by [the] state-court judgments’; (3) those judgments were rendered before 
the federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and 
reject the state judgments.”  Id. at 166 (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. 
Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)).  
 These requirements are squarely met here.  Shipman lost in state court when the 
Delaware Supreme Court upheld the Family Court’s custody order.  The state court 
judgments were rendered before he filed his complaint in District Court.  As noted above, 
Shipman asks the District Court to vacate the state court decisions for lack of jurisdiction 
and failure to follow state law and procedures.  To the extent Shipman claims violations 
of his rights to due process and equal protection and his Fourth Amendment rights, these 
                                                                                                                                                  
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).  
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claims stem from the state court decisions.  See id. at 166-67 (federal court lacks 
jurisdiction when the source of the injury is the state court judgment as opposed to the 
defendant’s actions).3  Because we conclude that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies, 
we need not address the other reasons advanced by the District Court in dismissing the 
complaint. 
 We also conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Shipman’s motion for recusal.  Shipman sought recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) based 
on the District Judge’s adverse rulings in his other cases.  As recognized by the District 
Court, “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality 
motion.”  Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994).  To the extent Shipman 
contends that the District Judge formed opinions based on events occurring in his other 
proceedings, he has not shown a “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make 
fair judgment impossible.”  Id.  
 Accordingly, because this appeal does not raise a substantial question, we will 
summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court.  Shipman’s motion to stay his 
appeal is denied. 
                                              
3Shipman also asserted in his complaint that a constitutional challenge to a state statutory 
scheme is cognizable under § 1983, but he did not bring such a challenge. 
